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P AT E N T  L AW
The Standard for Awarding Attorney Fees Under 35 U.S.C. § 285  
to Prevailing Parties in Patent Litigation
CASE AT A GLANCE 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two patent infringement cases that both concern shifting of 
attorney fees under the “exceptional case” standard of 35 U.S.C. § 285. The Federal Circuit has traditionally 
been resistant to fee shifting awards—especially in cases where an accused infringer is the prevailing 
party. In Octane Fitness, petitioner asks the Court to lower the standard for proving an exceptional case. In 
Highmark, petitioner asks for deference to lower court exceptional case findings. 
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems
Docket Nos. 12-1184 and 12-1163 
Argument Date: February 26, 2014
From: The Federal Circuit
by Dennis Crouch and Jafon Fearson
University of Missouri School of Law, Columbia, MO
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, each party to litigation ordinarily pays its own 
attorney fees regardless of the case outcome. In the patent litiga-
tion context, this changes as 35 U.S.C. § 285 provides an avenue 
for awarding “reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party” in 
“exceptional cases” at the discretion of the lower court. However, 
discretion only goes so far, and the Federal Circuit’s standard for 
classifying an “exceptional case” has been critiqued as too rigid, 
tough, and pro-patentee. It is those same complaints that led to 
reversal by the Supreme Court in a number of other patent cases 
such as KSR Int’l. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (obviousness) 
and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (injunc-
tive relief). 
In both Octane Fitness and Highmark, the Federal Circuit sided with 
the patentees who lost their infringement actions. In Octane Fitness, 
the Federal Circuit confirmed that the case was not “exceptional,” 
while in Highmark, a divided Federal Circuit reversed an excep-
tional case finding based upon a de novo appellate review that gave 
no deference to the district court’s finding that the lawsuit was 
objectively baseless. 
Patent litigation is incredibly expensive, and most patent infringe-
ment actions rely on alternative litigation financing such as contin-
gency fee. These two factors suggest that changing the likelihood 
of fee shifting is a form of tort reform that may greatly alter the risk 
calculus and the market for patent litigation. 
Although separate, the Supreme Court has paired these cases for 
oral arguments. 
ISSUES
In Octane Fitness, the question presented is: Does the Federal 
Circuit’s promulgation of a rigid and exclusive two-part test for 
determining whether a case is “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 
improperly appropriate a district court’s discretionary authority to 
award attorney fees to prevailing accused infringers in contraven-
tion of statutory intent and this Court’s precedent, thereby raising 
the standard for accused infringers (but not patentees) to recoup 
fees and encouraging patent plaintiffs to bring spurious patent 
cases to cause competitive harm or coerce unwarranted settlements 
from defendants? 
In Highmark, the question presented is: Is a district court’s excep-
tional case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285, based on its judgment that 
a suit is objectively baseless, entitled to deference?
FACTS 
ICON originally sued Octane for infringing its patent covering a 
particular configuration of an elliptical exerciser. U.S. Patent No. 
6,019,710. After two years of pretrial litigation, the district court 
awarded Octane summary judgment of noninfringement. However, 
the district court refused to then award attorney fees under § 285 
based upon the Federal Circuit’s Brooks Furniture standard. Brooks 
Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of 
fees—holding that the court was not prepared “to revisit the settled 
standard for exceptionality.”
Highmark centers on a computerized health management system 
covered by Allcare’s U.S. Patent No. 5,301,105. The lawsuit arose 
when Highmark filed action seeking a declaratory judgment of  
noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability, and Allcare  
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counterclaimed with allegations that Highmark infringed claims 52, 
53, and 102 of the ’105 patent. On summary judgment, the district 
court agreed with Highmark that the challenged claims were not 
infringed and also awarded attorney fees based upon an exceptional 
case finding—stating that Allcare had engaged in “the sort of 
conduct that gives the term ‘patent troll’ its negative connotation.” 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit confirmed the noninfringement 
holding but partially reversed the fee award since Allcare’s infringe-
ment theory vis-à-vis claim 52 was “not objectively baseless” and 
none of Allcare’s litigation actions rose to actionable litigation 
misconduct. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to 
the district court “for a calculation of attorneys’ fees based on the 
frivolity of only the 102 claim allegations.” The Federal Circuit gave 
no deference to the district court conclusion that all of Allcare’s 
infringement allegations were objectively baseless. Rather, the 
Federal Circuit reviewed that issue de novo. Although the request 
for en banc review was denied, five of the eleven voting judges 
would have reheard the case. One dissent noted that the majority 
decision “establishes a review standard for exceptional case finding 
in patent cases that is squarely at odds with the highly deferential 
review adopted by every regional circuit and the Supreme Court in 
other areas of law.” 
CASE ANALYSIS
The primary focus of both appeals is the exceptional case deter-
mination with Octane addressing the substantive requirements 
necessary to prove an exceptional case and Highmark addressing 
the procedural standard of review and level of deference given to the 
lower court. 
U.S. patent infringement litigation typically follows the traditional 
American Rule that each party is responsible for its own attorney 
and expert witness fees. The patent statute does provide for a 
reasonable fee shifting award, but only to the “prevailing party” and 
only in “exceptional cases.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. The Federal Circuit has 
established a four-step process for evaluating claims under § 285 
that involves determining (1) the prevailing party; (2) whether the 
case is exceptional; (3) if exceptional, whether a fee award is ap-
propriate; and (4) the amount of the award, if any.
In its 2005 Brooks Furniture decision, the Federal Circuit laid down 
its structure for the exceptional case test. There, the court seem-
ingly spelled out a limited set of actions sufficient to prove an excep-
tional case. In particular, the court noted that an exceptional case 
award may only be based upon either (1) material inappropriate 
conduct; or (2) objectively baseless litigation brought in subjective 
bad faith. According to the Federal Circuit: 
A case may be deemed exceptional when there has been 
some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter 
in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequi-
table conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during 
litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct 
that violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, or like infractions … Absent 
misconduct in conduct of the litigation or in securing the 
patent, sanctions may be imposed against the patentee 
only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad 
faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.
The test for baseless litigation is derived from the Supreme Court 
Noerr-Pennington line of cases that protect parties who petition the 
government from being charged with anticompetitive behavior—
even when seeking anticompetitive action from the government. 
That doctrine has been extended to shield private tort actions as 
well—absent sham litigation. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (only sham litigation if 
both objectively and subjectively baseless). 
The language of § 285 has remained unchanged since its enactment 
as part of the major patent reforms of 1952. The predecessor statute, 
passed a few years earlier in 1946, was substantially similar but 
had two major differences. In particular, the 1946 act expressly gave 
the court “discretion” to award attorney fees to the prevailing party, 
while the 1952 act removed the “discretion” language and instead 
indicated that the fee may be awarded “in exceptional cases.” The 
Senate Report associated with the 1946 act indicates that the stat-
ute is not intended to make fee awards an “ordinary thing in patent 
suits” but instead to reserve such awards for “gross injustice.”
It is not contemplated that the recovery of attorney’s fees 
will become an ordinary thing in patent suits, but the 
discretion given the court in this respect, in addition to 
the present discretion to award triple damages, will dis-
courage infringement of a patent by anyone thinking that 
all he would be required to pay if he loses the suit would 
be a royalty. The provision is also made general so as to 
enable the court to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged 
infringer.
S. Rep. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). When the 1952 act 
was passed, the House Committee Report briefly mentioned the 
“exceptional case” amendment to the statute—indicating that the 
phrase “‘in exceptional cases’ has been added as expressing the 
intention of the present statute as shown by its legislative history 
and as interpreted by the courts.”
In its briefing, Octane argues that the Brooks Furniture test is overly 
constrictive on district court discretion and flawed. In particular, 
Octane argues that the First Amendment concerns that motivate 
Noerr-Pennington are not present in the fee-shifting context and 
that the result of the Brooks Furniture test is a disparate treatment 
that disfavors awarding fees to accused infringers who prevail at 
trial in violation of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court  
in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (holding that plain-
tiffs and defendants must be treated alike under an analogous fee-
shifting provision in copyright law). In the end, Octane argues that 
the test should revert back to an Equitable Discretion Test (EDT), 
which allows district courts to consider the totality of the circum-
stances when determining exceptional case fee awards.
In response, ICON argues Octane has mischaracterized Brooks 
Furniture and that the test is not so restrictive. In particular, ICON 
notes that, under the Brooks Furniture test, accused infringers 
who prevail in litigation can prove an exceptional case by a variety 
of mechanisms that go well beyond the strict baseless litigation 
standard. Brooks Furniture specifically calls out litigation miscon-
duct, inequitable conduct by the patentee, as well as “vexatious 
or unjustified litigation” as justification for an exceptional case 
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finding. More broadly, Brooks Furniture identifies the possibility of 
exceptional case awards based upon any “material inappropriate 
conduct related to the matter in litigation.” However, ICON agrees 
that the current test is more restrictive than pure equitable discre-
tion. According to ICON, applying that test would effectively read 
the phrase “exceptional cases” out of the statute, eliminating a key 
limitation imposed by Congress. 
In deciding patent cases, the Supreme Court frequently considers 
whether principles in other areas of intellectual property law provide 
guidance. Here, Octane suggests that the Court consider both  
trademark and copyright law. The Lanham Act’s fee shifting statute 
for trademark infringement is textually identical to patent law’s  
§ 285 and the “exceptional case” limitation has been interpreted at 
the circuit court level as providing equitable discretion to district 
courts instead of being limited by any rigid formula. Noxell Corp. v. 
Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). The Noxell case is particularly important here because it was 
penned by Justice Ginsburg (then Judge Ginsberg) and joined by 
Justice Scalia (then Judge Scalia) who were colleagues on the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals before being elevated to the Supreme Court. 
In Noxell, the appellate panel held that bad faith was not necessary 
for an exceptional case finding. Similarly, Octane argues that in Fo-
gerty, the Supreme Court gave equitable discretion to district courts 
in awarding fees. ICON attempts to distinguish those cases by 
pointing to the “surprising lack of agreement” as to the meaning of 
“exceptional case” and by highlighting the less restrictive language 
of the copyright statute. 
Both parties also claim legislative history support. Octane asserts 
that Congress intended a broad conferral of equitable discretion 
upon the district courts to grant fee awards to wrongfully accused 
defendants to prevent “gross injustice[s],” and that the Brooks 
Furniture test conflicts with decades of judicial interpretation of  
§ 285, predating establishment of the Federal Circuit. ICON argues, 
however, that when Congress actually intends to give district courts 
discretion in a broad range, it does so expressly and does not con-
fine the exercise of discretion to “exceptional cases.” ICON further 
points to the fact that Congress affirmatively removed the statute’s 
pre-1952 reference to discretion in favor of the more particular 
exceptional case test. 
The United States filed an amicus brief strongly in support of  
Octane. The government relies on legislative history and similar 
areas of the law such as the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act 
in its argument that § 285 should be construed to allow a district 
court to authorize a fee award to a prevailing defendant when it 
determines—based on its analysis of the totality of circumstances 
present in each case—that such an award is necessary to prevent 
gross injustice to that defendant. The United States argues that 
the Federal Circuit’s Brooks Furniture test has diminished § 285’s 
effectiveness as a tool to discourage abusive patent litigation and 
mitigate injustice suffered by prevailing parties in particular cases.
At least one amici, the New York IP Law Association, takes a middle 
ground approach—agreeing with Octane that the bar is too high, 
but argues against a purely discretional and nonstructured totality 
of the circumstances test. A group of companies represented by 3M 
and General Electric, as amici, also suggest that any approach to 
an exceptional case test should focus on bad actions rather than on 
broad classes of actors, such as nonpracticing entities, and that any 
test should be balanced. 
To be sure, there are instances (some extremely well-pub-
licized) of patent litigation abuse involving non-practicing 
patent owners who use the courts in an effort to collect 
large numbers of nuisance settlements. Yet this problem, 
in the experience of Amici Companies, is no more serious 
than that created by many infringing defendants who rou-
tinely fight off meritorious patent suits by pressing scores 
of frivolous defenses and counterclaims, and who other-
wise rely upon dilatory tactics to force unjust settlements. 
Accordingly, the focus should be on curbing litigation 
misconduct wherever it occurs. An evenhanded standard, 
flexibly applied, allows just that. 
In the exceptional case procedural dispute, petitioner Highmark 
argues that a district court’s determination that a case was “ob-
jectively baseless” and thus amenable to an award of attorney fees 
should receive deferential appellate review rather than the de 
novo standard applied by the Federal Circuit. Highmark’s prin-
ciple argument is that the case is controlled by the prior Supreme 
Court decisions of Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), and 
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, 496 U.S. 384 (1990). In Pierce, the Court 
considered the proper standard of review for fee awards under the 
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). EAJA authorizes attorney fees 
when the United States’ position is not “substantially justified,” 
and Highmark argues that Pierce’s proposition that a position is not 
substantially justified if it has no “reasonable basis in both law and 
fact,” is a standard effectively identical to the Federal Circuit’s § 285 
test, which deems a position objectively baseless if “no reasonable 
litigant could believe it would succeed.” In Cooter, the Court consid-
ered the standard of review for decisions imposing Rule 11 sanc-
tions. Prior to Cooter, the courts of appeals applied three different 
standards of review to different kinds of Rule 11 questions—clear-
error review regarding the factual basis for a claim, de novo review 
of findings about whether a claim was “warranted by existing law,” 
and abuse-of-discretion review of the amount of sanctions imposed. 
The Federal Circuit adopted this same trifurcated standard for § 285, 
and Highmark argues that Cooter squarely rejects this approach. 
Highmark further asserts that the Court held that “all aspects” of 
a district court’s decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions—includ-
ing its “legal conclusions”—should be reviewed under a unitary, 
abuse-of-discretion standard. Highmark argues that both Pierce and 
Cooter address fee and sanction standards directly analogous to the 
“objective baselessness” test, and that the Supreme Court in both 
cases held that appellate courts should review awards under such 
provisions for abuse of discretion. 
Allcare responds that Pierce and Cooter actually work in its favor. All-
care asserts that Pierce noted that smaller dollar amounts counsels 
in favor of deferential review, while larger awards might suggest a 
more intensive review; and because patent cases commonly involve 
large potential damage awards, giving them de novo review does 
not raise the same concerns as raised in Pierce (that providing de 
novo review would result in the generation of additional appeals 
that would not otherwise be pursued). Allcare also argues that 
Cooter contradicts Highmark’s position because one of the factors 
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in favor of deferential review was that the district court was “best 
situated” to consider the “local bar’s litigation practices” as to when 
a Rule 11 sanction is warranted. Allcare argues that this is contrary 
to Congress’s express determination that local variations in the 
approach to patent litigation are undesirable, by its very creation of 
the Federal Circuit. 
Highmark also argues that the Federal Circuit’s consideration in 
undertaking de novo review of objective-baselessness findings—
namely, that some such findings may turn on legal issues—is flawed 
in light of Pierce; that Pierce called for deference even when the 
lower court determination was “based upon evaluation of the purely 
legal issue governing the litigation.” Relying again on the Federal 
Circuit’s role in promoting patent law uniformity, Allcare responds 
that the uniformity purpose can only be served if the Federal Circuit 
applies de novo review to questions involving the interpretation of 
the patent laws. The Federal Circuit decides many more patent cases 
than any individual district court and therefore, Allcare argues, it is 
much better suited to decide whether a litigant’s ultimately unsuc-
cessful position was nonetheless an objectively reasonable one. 
As in Octane, the United States filed an amicus brief supporting the 
petitioner in Highmark. Here, the government argues that an appel-
late court should review a district court’s exceptional case finding 
under 35 U.S.C. § 285 with deference, using an abuse-of-discretion 
standard. The United States offers three guideposts in support of 
its position: (1) Congress has long vested district courts with broad 
discretion to determine when fee awards are necessary to prevent 
gross injustice in appropriate patent cases—as evidenced by the 
1946 version of the fee-shifting provision; (2) a sixty-year tradition 
of deferential review strongly supports an abuse-of-discretion stan-
dard; and (3) in both Pierce and Cooter, the Supreme Court conclud-
ed that deferential review was appropriate because baselessness 
determination involves a fact-intensive analysis that the trial court 
is best positioned to conduct. However, the government does offer 
that even under the abuse-of-discretion standard, appellate courts 
remain free to reverse decisions premised on a pure error of law.
SIGNIFICANCE
Because of the high cost of patent litigation, a reduced standard for 
fee shifting has the potential of having a large impact on the litiga-
tion landscape. And, accused infringers are looking to fee shifting 
as a mechanism for reducing patent enforcement by nonpracticing 
entities. However, it is unclear whether an equally applied lower 
standard would have that result because defendants would also face 
the risk of being assessed fees. Several years ago, Professor Jay 
Kesan wrote about fee shifting in patent cases and concluded that 
there is no deserving theoretical reason for believing the British 
rule (liberally awarding fees) better promotes efficient primary 
behavior and that only when the analysis is limited to very specific 
cases, can it sometimes be shown that the British or American 
rule is more efficient. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a 
Better Patent System, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 763 (2002). However, 
an unbalanced standard of practice—especially one directed against 
nonpracticing entities—is likely to have a greater impact. Further, 
to the extent wide deference is given to district court judges on this 
issue, we should expect a greater degree of forum shopping and 
venue battles as parties seek audience before judges more favorable 
to their particular cause. 
In its briefing, ICON suggests that any policy-based shift in the rule 
should be left to Congress. In fact, several bills are pending in Con-
gress that would shift fees even further than that contemplated by 
petitioners here. The leading proposal overwhelmingly passed in the 
House with bipartisan support, is supported by President Obama, 
and is now being considered in the Senate. See Innovation Act, H.R. 
3309. The proposed legislation would rewrite § 285 to affirmatively 
require an award of reasonable fees to the prevailing party unless 
the court finds that “the position and conduct of the non-prevailing 
… parties were reasonably justified in law and fact” or that special 
circumstances would make an award unjust. Based upon its strong 
support, the bill has a substantial likelihood of passing in the Senate 
this term. If so, the Supreme Court decisions here would have little 
precedential value beyond the already pending lawsuits. However, a 
substantial contingent of patent litigators are hoping that Supreme 
Court action here will temper the fervor for legislative reform. 
One spillover in the case may be in the area of willful patent 
infringement. Under the patent statute, a willful infringer can be 
assessed with a punitive award of treble damages. In parallel to the 
exceptional case rule, willfulness requires a finding of both objective 
and subjective recklessness (or willfulness). There is some likeli-
hood that a shift on the standard of review for exceptional cases will 
lead to a shift on the willfulness side as well. In its amicus brief, 
Google cautioned against such a linkage. However, that issue will 
likely be reserved for future cases. 
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